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(Dated: February 23, 2009)
The credit crisis roiling the world’s financial markets will likely take years and entire careers
to fully understand and analyze. A short empirical investigation of the current trends, however,
demonstrates that the losses in certain markets, in this case the US equity markets, follow a cascade
or epidemic flow like model along the correlations of various stocks. This phenomenon will be shown
by the graphical display of stock returns across the network as well as the dependence of stock return
on topological measures. Finally, whether the idea of “epidemic” or a“cascade” is a metaphor or
model for this crisis will be discussed.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The barely covered story of rising foreclosures among
the condominiums of Florida or California in early 2007
was a harbinger of a much larger collapse in the world-
wide financial system. The increase of foreclosures over
the priced in foreclosure risk in mortgage backed secu-
rities, otherwise deemed high-grade assets, began the
confusion of the value of collateral assets and subse-
quent seizing up of credit markets around the globe.
The collapse of several institutions such as Bear Stearns,
Lehman, and Fortis has accentuated the level of crisis
now facing the world markets. Previously loosely regu-
lated titans of finance such as hedge funds and private
equity groups have been hit by waves of unprecedented
losses and demands by investors for redemptions, caus-
ing them to sell even more assets or close positions and
creating a positive feedback death spiral.
Though the hardest hit markets are lesser-known mar-
kets such as commercial paper, the equity markets have
become the most widely known indicators of the ongo-
ing meltdown. In fact, most non-experts likely use the
movements of the equity markets, fallaciously, as a key
gauge of the severity or progress of the crisis. The eq-
uity markets, however, did not originate the crisis nor are
they the key force perpetuating it. In this short paper,
the spread of the credit crisis will be discussed by refer-
ring to a correlation network of stocks in the S&P 500
and NASDAQ-100 indices. The fact that the spread re-
sembles a contagion or cascade, however, may be mainly
superficial given the underlying dynamics are completely
different.
II. NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
In this paper, a stock correlation network is created
similar to the one in work by [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. A corre-
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lation matrix of the returns between the two stocks is
created where the correlation between stocks i and j, ρij
is defined as
ρij =
E((Xi − µi)(Xj − µj))
σiσj
(1)
where Xi and Xj are the log-returns of stocks i and j
at a given time, µi and µj are the mean value of the stock
log-returns over the measured time period, and σi andσj
are the standard deviations of i and j over the measured
time period.
The correlation is taken over the time period August
1, 2007 to October 10, 2008 where each daily value of X
is the log-return of the closing price from the previous
day. As [1, 2] demonstrate, however, correlation is not a
distance metric, therefore we create an adjacency matrix
with weights on the edges matching the distance metric




Using these distances we finally create a minimal span-
ning tree using the python-graph module and animate
using pydot and Graphviz. Because over 500 stocks are
included, the ticker labels are relatively small but the
central part of the component is dominated (though not
exclusively) by finance and service sector stocks which
are heavily cross-correlated and thus tightly linked with
each other, while the outer branches are more industry
specific including utilities and basic materials and are the
later impacted stocks by the credit crisis (see Figure 1).
The stocks in Figure 3, represented as nodes, are col-
ored according to the following methodology based on
the stock return since August 1, 2007.
Events in the figures are taken from the timeline at [6].
The fall in stock valuations flows outward in the corre-
lation network from stocks with relatively high centrality
in the center to those on the periphery which are more
industry specific or otherwise uncorrelated to the core
sectors of the stock market. In Figure 2 this spread is




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIG. 1: Sectors represented by stocks in the network. Green
are finance or service firms, red are healthcare, grey are util-
ities, yellow are technology firms, black are basic materi-
als, purple are conglomerates, blue are consumer goods, and
brown and industrial goods. Industry sector break outs are
according to Hoovers.
at a distance d from the stock with the highest betweeen-
ness centrality (here CBS, a major S&P 500 stock and
here classified under the services industry) where d is de-
fined from equation 2. Here we see that the greater the
distance from the central parts of the network, the more
delayed the decline in valuation. Therefore the credit cri-
sis spreads among affected stocks from more centralized
nodes to more outer ones as the news of the extent of the
damage to the global economy spreads.
III. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Using methods of statistical physics and complex net-
works to investigate phenomena in stock markets is in-
creasingly common [7, 8, 9, 10]. The increasing complex-
ity and globalization of financial markets has led to many
large and sometimes unpredictable effects. In [11] the ef-
fects of globalization upon the Korea Stock Exchange
was demonstrated by showing the increasing grouping
coefficient of stocks from 1980-2003. The credit crisis,
however, presents a challenge of a whole new magnitude.
As has been viewed by the wider market, the collapse
in stock price returns begins in the financial and services
sector of the economy. Soon it moved across more main-
line banks and firms and finally, more recently has af-
fected stocks across the board. Though the spread of the
collapse in stocks down the tree resembles an infection or











































































































FIG. 2: Average returns of stocks from August 1, 2007 by
distance from stock with the highest betweenness centrality
(CBS). Orange is the average return of stocks at distance
0 < d ≤ 0.4, green at distance 0.4 < d ≤ 0.8, blue at distance
0.8 < d ≤ 1.2, purple at distance 1.2 < d ≤ 1.6, and black at
distance 1.6 < d ≤ 2.0 (the maximum allowed by the metric
in equation 2)
cascade on a network, such ideas are more appropriately
viewed as analogies or metaphors than explanations. Un-
like a disease or cascading collapse, the stock crash is not
being transmitted from one stock to another. What the
collapse reveals is a complex and collective systemic col-
lapse of the financial system which spreads as its extent
becomes more recognized and affects the credit or de-
mand for sectors across the economy.
The spread is carried both by the news of the extent of
the crisis expanding and the fact that similar asset bases
and capital structures make highly correlated stocks simi-
larly vulnerable. In addition as credit becomes restricted,
capital flows formerly relied on as a given begin to disap-
pear causing financial difficulties in companies and selling
of equities (among other assets) to raise capital. As panic
and the extent of the devastation spreads, stocks are pun-
ished accordingly. In normal times, the failure of a com-
pany and its stock is not a cause for a systemic crisis.
Also, since the correlation was calculated over an entire
year’s activity, the stock prices are correlated since they
tend to fall similarly over time. The correlation shown
in this network does not cause the transmission chain of
collapse but is inextricably tied to it. In addition, cor-
relation generally increases with volatility (for example,
see [12]) and negative returns effect volatility more than
positive returns of the same magnitude [13, 14]. So over






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FIG. 3: Diagrams show the spread of the credit crisis across nodes of the stock correlation network for different dates. From the
top left, (a)August 10, 2007 when the crisis in mortgage backed securities first began causing widespread market volatility, (b)
September 14, 2007, the collapse of British lender Northern Rock and its bailout by the British government which accentuated
the global spread of the crisis, (c) January 17, 2008, turbulence in January 2008 due to the increasing fear of instability in
the financial sector, (d) March 17, 2008, the collapse of the once venerable Wall Street investment bank Bear Stearns, (e)
September 15, 2008, the even more destabilizing collapse of Lehman Brothers, and (f) October 10, 2008 ending of the worst
performing week for the Dow Jones Industrial Average in history. Green nodes represent a current arithmetic return greater
than -10%. Yellow nodes represent a current return between -10% and -25%. Red nodes represent a current return less than
-25%.
4and the network will likely be more dense and structure
differently due to the steadily increasing market volatil-
ity.
Finally, one should note, this is not an example of the
widely cited ‘financial contagion’ in the press. Financial
contagion refers to the coupling of financial panic across
national borders and not among stocks in an exchange.
However, these do illustrate the spread of the credit crisis
and how what was once a problem among home builders
and mortgage finance companies has engulfed the entire
economy.
[1] JC Gower,“Some distance properties of latent root
and vector methods used in multivariate analysis”,
Biometrika, 53, 325 (1966).
[2] RC Mantegna,“Hierarchical structure in financial mar-
kets”, Eur. Phys. J. B, 11, 193 (1999).
[3] RN Mantegna & HE Stanley, An Introduction to Econo-
physics: Correlations and Complexity in Finance, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, (1999).
[4] HJ Kim, IM Kim, Y Lee, & B Kahng, “Scale-free net-
work in stock markets”, Journal of the Korean Physical
Society, 40, 1105 (2002).
[5] HJ Kim, YK Lee, B Kahng, & IM Kim, “Weighted scale-
free network in financial correlations”, Journal of the
Physical Society of Japan, 71, 2133, 2002.
[6] J Cox,“Credit Crisis Timeline”, The University of Iowa
Center International Finance and Development, retrieved
October 17, 2008 (2008).
[7] XT Zhuang, ZF Min, & SY Chen, “Characteristic anal-
ysis of complex network for Shanghai Stock Market”,
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science), 28,
1053 (2007) (in Chinese).
[8] L Ping & BH Wang, “A dynamic model of Heng Seng
Index based on complex network eigenvectors”, Systems
Engineering, 24, 73 (2006) (in Chinese).
[9] GB Oh & SH Kim, “Statistical properties of the returns
of stock prices of international markets”, Journal of the
Korean Physical Society, 48, 197 (2006).
[10] HH Jo & SY Kim, “Detrended fluctuation analysis in the
Korean bond futures exchange market”, 49, 1691 (2006).
[11] WS Jung, O Kwon, JS Yang, & HT Moon, “Effects of
globalization in the Korean financial market”, Journal of
the Korean Physical Society, 48, 135 (2006).
[12] TG Andersen, T Bollerslev, FX Diebold, & H
Ebens,“The distribution of realized stock return volatil-
ity”, J. of Financial Economics, 61, 43 (2001).
[13] F Black, “Studies of stock market volatility changes”,
Proceedings of the American Statistical Association,
Business and Economic Statistics Section, 177 (1976).
[14] JY Campbell & L Hentschel, “No news is good news:
an asymmetric model of changing volatility in stock re-
turns”, J. of Financial Economics, 31, 281 (1992).
